Divergent Metropolis: Report 1

The following is the first in a series of psychogeographic reports on experimental walks, my friends and I have been taking in Houston. The project has connections around the globe with scholars and urban planners in Canada, the U. S., Mexico, and elsewhere.

Read more at the website of the Social Agency Lab: an exciting urban planner group that is one of the project’s key partners along with Rice University Anthropology and TxRx

The city of Houston is not that hard to get lost in. The lack of zoning means you can be looking for a commercial space in the most residential of areas. The constancy of the strip mall emplaces one’s psychogeography in a feedback loop of ubiquitous repetition. Psychogeography, by the way, was a word which Guy Debord—most prominent of the French avant-garde “situationist” group—used to describe the way walking in the city can give rise to effects in the mind. In order to rupture the banality of routine or, on the other hand, the kind of irking accidental lostness I just described, the situationists were interested in a kind of walking that could bring about lostness as a technique, a practice, a style. They called this practice of perambulation a dérive. “Dérives involve playful-constructive behavior,” Debord famously stated; they necessitate an “awareness of psychogeographical effects, and are thus quite different from the classic notions of journey or stroll.” I recently participated in the first of a series of attempts to ask what it would mean to partake in the dérive in American cities today, now, in 2011. This premier experiment took place in downtown Houston.
Now, downtown Houston is probably quite a difficult place to get lost in. It’s built on a grid system right? Bombed out as downtown is it is a perfect replication of a structure of city planning as normativization first identified by architect Rem Koolhaas in late 1970s. He asserted that the layout of cities on a grid pattern, most famously in Manhattan, was an “intellectual program” not merely excusable by its “apparent neutrality. Neil Campbell, has noted that, though the grid begins with Manhattan’s 1811 layout, it extended quickly to many cities in the American west and even the organization of the agricultural face of frontier geography. “There are,” he asserts, “curious coherencies between the story of city and country, East and West, as a collision of the desire for control, and pattern with straight lines and rectangles.” Bringing things back to the city, Campbell notes that the urban ‘new frontier’disciplined space through accepted and designated ‘efficiencies’ or ‘metropolitan manifest destiny.’” Houston, with its marginal status with regard to both the “American West” proper (certainly not in the South East despite its geography and not neatly at the frontier between East and West as are Dallas-Fort Worth) and the truly urban (no zoning, excess of suburban commuters, etcetera, etcetera). And yet, in the middle of all this, here’s this grid: the epitome of either and the fulcrum between the two.
We began our dérive at Texas Avenue and Main. Setting two newly relocated Houston arrivals as our guides, we were able to assure ourselves that the grid wouldn’t own us. We’d get lost no matter what. As Debord asserted, derive “includes both this letting-go and its necessary contradiction: the domination of psychogeographical variations by the knowledge and calculation of their possibilities.” This was the idea then, coordinate our own loss of control, calculate the letting go. We were soon to discover that Debord was also right when he noted that: “Chance is a less important factor in this activity than one might think: from a dérive point of view cities have psychogeographical contours, with constant currents, fixed points and vortexes that strongly discourage entry into or exit from certain zones.” Before too long, past water installations, with parkour pathways opening up along sculpted granite paths, corporate carparks, and every available railing, we were drawn by out hapless guides toward a beautiful inevitability: we happened upon Allen’s Landing. The site of the 1836 arrival from downriver by the Allen brothers who founded the city. That was the beginning of our psychogeographical investigation as conversation soon turned to the historical indices from then to now; Zakcq Lockrem shed a great deal of light for me on the transformations in Houston history, as other companions clambered the nearby railings and leapt to the water’s edge.
But the point, as Marx said, is not to interpret the world, but to change it. As we wandered further along the banks, under the Main Street bridge, change meant clambering ceaselessly: ducking, diving, and ninja rolling. It meant getting to a place where one would never normally walk, halfway up the bridge in dusty, distant spots. But then, as I looked around at the many homeless people who inhabited the space less as a playground and more as a site of necessity, I came to reflect on what our urban tourism might mean. If there was an ethics to this encounter, it would have to begin with a moment of interaction. It would be necessary not only to play in their world, but listen to and encounter their worlding. As we wandered further up the Landing, transient downtown dwellers were laid out in demarcated spaces, almost their own, self-imposed grid. As my friends spoke to a man known only as Mr Grumbles, who, along with his wife, claims the local ducks as his “children,” I noticed an argument breaking out between a woman—call her Geraldine—her daughter—call her Alice—and a shirtless man. A minor altercation, it turned out to be, he was drunk and dispensing advice on Alice’s recent pregnancy; advice which turned out to be unwelcome. But, offering my support, I made sure Geraldine and Alice were ok. He would sleep it off, Geraldine said. But he wasn’t welcome in her “camp” that night. Her camp? I asked what she meant: “do people know that this spot is yours?” “Oh yeah, a lot of people have camps down on the bayou she said, that you don’t touch—and this is mine!” A whole basis of social organization was potentially implicit, a territoriality of implied privacy, even as, on that hot night, people were sleeping in the open air. As we wandered back up to the Fannin Street bridge and mulled over the implications of the encounter, I felt as though I had blundered into a glimpse of another world. As a privileged guest, no doubt. As a tourist in a social reality which I could escape and Geraldine and Alice could not. The psychogeography of downtown Houston will nonetheless always be altered for me. The first step, I imagine, in making that make a difference, is writing this; it’s telling you. Perhaps we can produce some new maps that redefine the territory.

http://anthropology.rice.edu/

Honey Bees in H-Town: On Apidaeic Art

Detail from "Lessons From the Hive" by Rebecca Benitez. Photo: Author.

Honey bees make their world through a multiple resonance system that takes into account ultra violet radiation, the position of the sun, and a twofold process of dancing. Bees move in circling dervish runs, clockwise or counterclockwise—depending on the orientation of hive to helios. This tells other bees the exact angle by which to triangulate the position of a pollen source in relation to the sun. Then they swoop back and waggle their tails down the central axis of the funky protractor they’ve produced through the first step in their choreography. It’s through the abdomen shaking of step two that the bee indicates the distance her fellow bees should travel down the path along the vector she’s just mapped out. If you’re a bee, the longer you shake your abdomen, further away the honey’s at.

Allison Hunter, Untitled (Butterfly #2, 2007).

Houston, Texas may seem an unlikely place to be thinking about bees. But two recent art shows are thinking through what bees have to teach us about technology, urban planning, genetic modification, and climate change to name only a few of many issues. Allison Hunter’s Honey Bee is an installation running at the University of Houston’s TLC2 Artist in Residence Program: a program designed to bring art and technology together. Rebecca Benitez’s Lessons From the Hive is installed along with the work of five other artists at Project Row Houses in Third Ward. Both say striking and fascinating things about the dancing honey gatherer.         

      Benitez has been making connections between bees and communities since she was a high school student. For Benitez, the hive is a social collectivity that has “survive[d] everything from continent breakups to drastic climate changes.” When you walk through the row-house where her bee sculptures are installed, you find paper drones circling above, perhaps on their way back to some cyborg nest to recover and shake it to a beat that lets their brood know where the honey’s at. Then you see the hive itself, clusters of mixed-media honeycomb which, as you approach, offers a selection of hexagons and honey yellow. Some of these open, suggesting a living ecology frozen static; others feature old fragments of third ward maps hovering around the theme of urban renewal.    

[Maybe urban space is not so much under question: watch Houstonians  dancing at the opening of Project Row House's Summer Sessions]

  Hunter’s piece inhabits a divergent but proximate urban ecology. Not so far away, on the UH campus, you find yourself looking for a movie theatre along hallways that have the distinct feel of a technologies lab—because  TLC2 is a bit of both. Curator and TLC2 Visualization Specialist Michael Brims wants to bring new technologies like 3D cinema and motion detection gaming hardware into the hands of artists like Hunter and her co-exhibitor Chuck Ivy. After you pass from the hallway and enter the cinema, you slip on a pair of 3D glasses and the film rolls. The phenomenological dimensions of this site placement are unnerving in the best way.

Hunter’s piece runs at two conceptual and articulatory velocities that meet between sound and vision. The soundscape careens along a non-linear tour through the technological vicissitudes of the green revolution. It moves between audio resonances: from 1920s agricultural aviation through to climate change and the politics of genetic modification to, finally, U.S. military imperialism. The film warns us that there’s certainly something worrying in our nomenclature around this incredible insect. We call one of the bee brethren a drone, the same word we use. for unmanned aircraft that assassinate dissidents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The soundscape alone offers a parodic commentary, both subtle and wry, on the intersecting political dimensions of human management of geopolitical and biopolitical terrains. It draws out the unsettling semantics of so much disturbing noise about which we remain complacent. Yet, it’s the cross-articulation of sound and vision that expands the piece’s contribution.

Where Hunter’s soundscape samples, fragments, and critiques the twentieth century geopolitical and biopolitical milieu which its audience inhabits, the 3D video that it accompanies is more invested in the shifting phenomenological dimensions of dwelling in that milieu. The video opens with a Lynchian mid shot of a lavender bush in bloom, with bees wending their way through the flowers. I mention Lynch because one is reminded of the extreme close up of the beetles that opens Blue Velvet. But where, for Lynch, the beetles troped decay, fear, audio surveillance, Hunter offers us something more enticing, if just as sublimely posthuman. Hunter’s shot is like the anthropomorphic gaze of an onlooker homo sapien. And it is the anthropocentrism of this gaze that Hunter will confront, transform, and morph into apidae as the piece runs on. Hunter’s Honey Bee apidaecizes the scopophilic drive of the human spectator. We are forced to remain calm as bees whizz by in 3D, flashing so close to our eyes that we blink and recoil, almost crawling across the cornea. Then, we follow a slow zoom into the honey comb as video game snipers mark a target. From there, one enters Hunter’s imaginary of the worlding of a bee. From this perspective, geopolitics is no longer human.  

Rebecca Benitez’s Lessons from the Hive  is showing as part of the 2011 Summer Sessions at Project Row Houses along with work by Logan Beck, Catherine Cartwright, Brittney Connelly, Matthew Gorgol, Lynissa Hayes, and Tony McMillian until September 11th. 2521 Holman St

Allison Hunter’s Honey Bee held an open day on August 23rd as part of the exhibition of the TLC2′s A-I-R program. Further screenings at TLC2 Visualization Theater (University of Houston PGH 216) can be scheduled through Michael Brims. michael@tlc2.uh.edu

We recommend you contact Michael and see the piece properly installed. However, there is a link to a 2D version of Honey Bee is available on vimeo at http://www.vimeo.com/28255518

Chuck Ivy’s installation was called Infrared Musical Activity and showed in the Courtyard of UH.  

Visitors observe "Lessons from the Hive." Photo: Author.

New Article Forthcoming: Apidaeic Art in Houston

Negotiating Native Title and Mining in 2011

Life has been hectic of late. So I apologize for this post’s brevity.

The  mining company Fortescue Minerals Group had been in negotiations with the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation in the Pilbara region of Western Australia for some time when, it is alleged, they staged a meeting designed to bring these negotiations to a rapid conclusion.

FMG had opened negotiations by curtailing the possibility of a 5% royalty which later moved to a 2.5% royalty. FMG has refused such a royalty, but rather, wants to offer a flat fee per anum. The clincher is they want to supplant this deficit with jobs and training as a substitute for paying their due share for mining on traditional Yindjibarndi land; they want training in kind to supplant property rights. For FMG the perception of Aboriginal disadvantage being a product of welfarism (prevalent among white Australians)  has become a basis from which to negotiate a lower rate of compensation for the irreparable cultural and ecological transformation entailed by major mining projects like the Solomon Hub planned on Yindjibarndi Land.

The facts surrounding this impasse have been loosely available online, they have been best collected to date in an ABC current affairs report from last month (just to throw a spanner in the works of those who believe state media are anathema to objectivity). I urge you to watch this report, as well as the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation’s video alleging dodgy dealings on the part of FMG in relation to a community meeting.

FMG‘s head Andrew “Twiggy” Forrest is famous for asserting that he cares deeply for Aboriginal people and he has worked with with key national Aboriginal leaders like Marcia Langton and Noel Pearson with regard to programs like the AEC to place Aboriginal people in employment.

Two key issues, I want to highlight here.

The first regards technicalities of the Native Title tribunal. There is presently a 6 month statute of limitations on  native title negotiations such as this. At present, this statute of limitations means that the pressure is primarily on indigenous groups and not on mining companies to come to an agreement—even if this is not an agreement that suits the traditional owners’ needs. It seems to me that, in light of situations like the Yindjibarndi impasse, bargaining power should be placed with traditional owners by extending the time for negotiations in the face of the Tribunal.

The second regards the fact that job provision should never be used to supplant people’s basic rights: in this case, native title rights. “Foretescue has always gone beyond” the terms of its agreements, Forrest asserts, in assisting Aboriginal communities. “But,” he inserts a caveat, “not with cash payments.” Rather, Forrest believes that giving traditional owners an insufficient deal can be supplanted by funding jobs and training programs. While such vocational support may be positive and benevolent, it seems to me that it cannot be a replacement for the genuine property rights to which traditional owners have access according to the principles of native title. You can’t supplant property rights with promises of jobs and training. It might be a good thing that Twiggy Forrest wants to provide such jobs and training but justice is impeded at the moment when he wants to see such a contribution as capable of supplanting his obligations to compensate Aboriginal people for work on their property.

But ultimately, until the regulations of the Native Title Tribunal are changed, he will continue to be able to set the terms by which this impasse is negotiated.

Reflections of a Fishandchipocrite.

“[A]s long as the automatic exclusion of animals from ethical standing remains intact simply because of their species, such a dehumanization via animalization will be readily available for deployment against whatever body that happens to fall outside the ethnocentric ‘we.’ ” 1.

—Cary Wolfe

The question of the suffering of non-human animals came to the forefront (as it so rarely does) of the mainstream media in Australia recently, when the august 4 Corners program aired a story on the treatment of cattle — exported alive from Australia — in Indonesian Abbatoirs. As someone who strives to act ethically, I also consider the ethics of what I eat. I am largely an ovo-lacto-vegetarian, though, eating fish infrequently, I am known to my more rigorously vegan friends as a fishandchipocrite; I find the label so hilarious I am happy with it. “Man,” said Nietzsche, “alone suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter.” Perhaps man suffers no less deeply than “others,” but the connection between suffering—even empathy—and laughter is worth bearing in mind.

This is a good segue to what I want to draw attention to in this post: the question of suffering as it traverses the species barrier, or, why the suffering of animals cannot be extricated from the politics of the way humans treat one another. In other words, questions of ethics, intersubjectivity, governance, citizenship and mutual regard affects us in a way that strikes deep at the animalian core of our soul. The way we treat the most vulnerable — and animals are uniquely vulnerable to human whim — indexes an intersecting set of concerns. Whether you think you are entitled to mistreat non-human animals — or participate in their mistreatment via a remove — may indeed be connected to the mistreatment of humans.

This is one way of describing at least some aspects of what Peter Singer has famously called speciesism. As my epigraph from Wolfe puts the issue: as long as we subsist in maintaining a category of radical killable (but not sacrificiable) creatures, that category remains open as a space into which humans themselves can be banished, tortured, or put to death. I put the present point this way in an article from last year: “The tense relation . . . between the kin and the essentially other, between the potential person and a ‘living magazine of flesh’—each of these early modern binaries pre-empts what Judith Butler identifies in the twenty-first century as ‘indefinite detention,’ to which we all remain potentially subject.” 2.

I plan, when time permits, to write more on this topic. In particular, I will aim to draw out the ethical tensions between our extant culture of meat processing (not only factory farming, much Australian cattle is relatively free range), our economic reliance on such industrial slaughter, and questions of pragmatics (what does it mean to compromise vis a vis live animal export specifically).

MRG

1. Wolfe, “Before the Law: Animals in a Biopolitical Frame,” in Law, Culture, and the Humanities. 6, 1 (2010): 8–23, 16.

2. Griffiths, “‘The Tame from the Wild.’” in Humanimalia 1, 2 (2010).

A Note on Poststructuralist Notetaking re: “The State” (Supplement, June)

“decoding + conjunction = capture”

This is a quote from some fragmentary notes I am writing on Deleuze and Guattari for the deep background of my dissertation (which, in its present draft, hardly names the two schizoanalysts). I am trying to better understand whether the pair have a concept of the “state” and how to communicate with mainstream political philosophy vis a vis “the state.” What I am trying to do in the ultimate document is make Deleuze and Guattari’s insights useful for my writing on indigenous peoples and the state without alllowing their complex lexicon to render matters obscure. It’s a tough tightrope to walk. I took these notes from Paul Patton’s book on Deleuze and the Political, because one key paradigm he explores is colonization. Essentially, for Deleuze and Guattari, indigenous peoples can be understood as possessing a certain territoriality, a certain way of understanding space, and this territoriality is external to, indeed alien to, the nomos (legal distribution of space and land) of the colonial and postcolonial state. Most mainstream political philosophy conceives the state according to a liberal, contract-based analysis. To put these notes in context, they are an attempt to draw out how D and G see “the State” through this other lens of deterritorializing machine, terraforming and transforming the territoriality of a space’s original inhabitants according to a mechanism of economic capture and subjectification/subjection.

This is not a fully formed argument, it is a note on note taking. I’m just giving the context of where these notes fit in a wider project.

I thought I’d post it here as an example of how, for better or for worse, the complex (and often isolated) lexicons of poststructuralist thinkers lead to eccentric notetaking practices. In fact, as I write this, I am thinking of the inappropriateness of the word “eccentric” for what I am trying to describe. Eccentric usually means unusual because it refers to being “outside the circle;” ec-centric. Yet eccentric can also refer to one term in a series of physical and empirical descriptions of the relation between force and motion as it pertains to circles, spheres, and wheels. It is just this sort of linguistic intersection that simultaneously baffle and entrance students of poststructuralism. The risk and excitement of this form of thinking emerges as one attempts to create new concepts (as Deleuze and Guattari understood philosophy per se) without falling into the terrain of the pleonasm.

Here is a piece of note-taking that I undertook recently on Deleuze, the State, and capital:

“There are 3 kinds of state for D and G:

1-Imperial archaic state / Urstaat.
Characterized by “machinic enslavement” ie—where money and such abstract tender only exists for the purposes of taxation flowing to the despot.

2-’The second type of state is one where machinic enslavement is replaced by a regime of social subjection.’
There is a much more rigorous bond of dependence and obligation on the sovereign.
Includes feudal systems monarchies city states

3-Modern nation states in the capitalist global order.
Emergence of capitalism. Generalized decoding.
Maps onto a Foucauldian sovereignty-discipline-biopower triad [?]
(100).
The State, for Deleuze and Guattari, is ‘the organization of conjunctions of decoded flows’ (101).

What does this mean?
Flows are typically of money, labor, property, include for instance: the movements of practices and crafts (metallurgy); capital or commodity flows; flows of population—of the bodies of those who practice and labor.
One other important flow, Paul Patton notes, is that of social outsiders, eg freed slaves in the Qin Dynasty (221 – 206 BCE).

[Might this also apply to indigenous people? Indeed, it would seem that those refused citizenship per seHomo Sacer, in Agamben's terms — would qualify. So, the next questio would be how did state interventions — assimilation, land appropriation — "code" or even "decode" and "overcode" indigenous lives.]

The latter two types of State, then, use “social subjectification” (the Urstaat used machinic enslavement) to decode these flows and conjoin them…

IOW : decoding + conjunction = capture (?)

The State, for D & G, is an apparatus of capture, which subjectivizes flows —which is to say decodes them and conjoins them.
However in a capitalist society, the State has less and less power. Typically the capitalist decodings, conjugated between unqualified labor and unqualified wealth traverse the surface of the socius according to an axiomatic that eludes state capture…typically.

Capital reterritorializes and the state attempts to reterritorialize these flows (103).”

Did this note-taking practice teach me something about Deleuze and Guattari? Absolutely. Will it interest you? Hopefully. Will it make a change in the world—on “the outside?” Who knows…

All quotes and page numbers are drawn from the excellent work of philosopher and translator of Deleuze, Paul Patton. See his Deleuze and the Political (Routledge 2000).

A Sufi Poem (Supplement, June)

Today is my birthday and I just discovered that I share the day (at least, according to many reckonings) with the 13th Century CE Sufi poet and mystic Fakhruddin Araq. Also, there have been some tragedies in the recent lives of friends and family and I felt that some of Araq’s life affirming words might be appropriate for the day.

Love the phoenix cannot be trapped
by Fakhruddin Araq
(June 10 1213 – 1289)

English Translation by
William Chittick and Peter Lamborn Wilson

Original Language
Persian/Farsi

Muslim / Sufi
13th Century

“Love the phoenix cannot be trapped
nor in heaven or earth can it be named;

no one has yet discovered its address:
its desert holds not a single footprint.

The world drains the last drops from its cup
though itself it is not outside the glass;

dawn and dusk I caress its face, its tresses,
though where it is no day or night exists.

Morning-breeze, if you pass its lane
I have no message for it but this:

My repose, who are my very life, without you
I can take no single breath at ease.

Everyone in this world wants something, but I
have no desire at all — except your lips;

from the moment my heart first fell into your locks
I’ve busied myself with nothing but lassos and snares.

How lucky to have a friend like you here below
(or Above)… The enemy hasn’t a chance!

Inaugurate a romance then with Araq
even though he’s unworthy of such a boon.”

I love the way, for Araq (at least as I am led to believe), love could be both personal and transcendent. The poem represents another, a figure of romantic, perhaps sexual rapture, whose “lips” are all the speaker desires, apart from which “I have no desire at all.” Yet the world itself is an active force of desire, “Everyone in this world wants something.” Finally, this figure is somehow connected with the titular “phoenix” and the very erotic movement of rising and falling (“a friend like you here below / [or Above]“) comes to collapse, entangle, and ultimately remake erotics as transcendence and transcendence as erotics. This movement of rising and falling simultaneously entangles sexual love and transcendence in a Gordian knot. Here, while the speaker has no desire but for this one woman, the world itself and its multiple immanent subjects are desiring entities. The speaker is both Araq and everyone, and yet the speaker desires nothing while noting the immanence of desire in “Everyone in this world.” Perhaps the transcendent movement of creation throught he mystical sublation of desire emerges, ironically, from this immanence. If this is so, then just as we rid ourselves of desire, we learn that the transcendence we seek embraces the desire of the entire planet. “Love” is a “phoenix” that “cannot be trapped,” even as —bound to paradox— it can never entirely be named…”in heaven or earth.”

On Climate Change, Risk, and Ecology

“And the haphazardness of great ecological catastrophes perfectly foreshadows what could result — on the social, economic, industrial, or biological level . . .”
— Paul Virilio. 1.

War, ecological devastation, and neocolonialism have long gone hand in hand. What, today, in the eyes of the dominant makes jus ad bellum, or “just war?” I want to begin by sugggesting that today this question cannot be asked merely in relation to the population of polis or demos — the population of citizens, potential citizens, and non-citizens that inhabit a territory. Rather, it must also be understood in relation to a whole milieu which emplaces the productive and destructive capacity of peoples in relation to the outside of human sociality: the living world, ecology — for want of a term that alludes either my vocabulary or the wider anglophone lexicon which conditions it.

Indeed, this question—what is just war—cannot merely operate upon questions of war in the limited sense of military intervention (though that, no doubt, will be a consideration). If, as Clausewitz wrote in 1816, “war is nothing but the continuation of state politics by other means” then state politics too is implicated in war and, by extension, ecology. This post is a meditation (without supplying easier answers, of which I have none to give) on the question of ecology, the state, and war. How do geopolitical responses to natural disasters reframe the way we think about either the notion of nature or that of disaster? Here I want to merely offer some important food for thought. As I say, I have no answers to offer.

Example 1: Military “Humanitarian” Interventions in Disaster Situations.

“Sometimes it takes a catastrophe to demonstrate just how much more the U.S. military is able to do than simply kill the enemy” (Time Jan 2010).

Time‘s writer, I think, meant this remark as an uncritical comment on the rapid U. S. humanitarian response in Haiti; but I think we might also reflect on the connection between military intervention and the annexation of space for fuure economic and security management.  We have had enough examples of “success” and “failure” of this kind in recent years. Haiti, Aceh, Chile, Katrina (Louisiana), the Northern Territory Intervention (Australia), all evinsce the connection between military intervention and geopolitical surveillance and control, under the alibi of the humanitarian. By this category, I mean the way humanitarian intevention is often shadowed by mechanisms of extraction colonialism. It has been suggested by Alain Badiou that even the recent insurrection in Libya falls falls into this category. This is quite a complex topic given to peculiar ipseity and specificity; for that reason I will say no more here, though further posts may attempt to address the specificity of particular situations.

Example 2: Nuclear energy

The question of nuclear power, however safe, clean, or otherwise its benfactors might claim it to be, will never be merely a question posable in isolation from concerns around geopolitics. The disaster in Japan, for instance, has global economic and geopolitical ramifications. The implications of this nuclear black swan (if it is such a thing) extend into the invisible tendrils of the acceptance of nuclear power as a viable alternative in the post-fossil fuel age that is on the horizon.I don’t have a formula to fix all this. But it is a topic that cannot go undiscussed and I thought I might just share some of the information I have encountered in order to frame the question of the connection between nuclear energy, the current move away from coal-based energy, and wider geopolitical concerns like the fear of nuclear war, nuclear arms traficking, or nuclear catastrophe.

Graphing a Black Swan

One key question concerns whether nuclear (non-)proliferation and the dreamed of future of clean nuclear power can be disentangled from one another. Some forms of radioactive material cannot be used in nuclear weapons. Others can. Uranium-233 (233U), Uranium-235 (235U), and Plutonium-239 (239Pu) all can be used in both industries. Other forms of plutonium could not be used in the making of nuclear weapons. Plutonium-240 (240Pu) and Plutonium-241 (241Pu) are produced and consumed in Nuclear Power production but neither can be used for Nuclear Weapons. This does not cancel out the ecological issues, but would potential disentangle weapons proliferation and power questions. Here, I merely want to frame this issue as one in which geopolitics, ecology, and questions of policy cannot easily be diarticulated.

Example 3: Climate Change

Let me say from the outset: I accept that anthropogenic climate change is real. 18 nation states are now implementing or considering implementing measures to reduce emissions. However, my concern here is less the reality of this, as Tim Morton calls them, hyperobject — itself an incomprehensible, if partially calculable, eventuality — than the effect which our imaginary surrounding it has on notions of the knowledge of risk in the future. Today, politics and economics cannot be extricated from attempts to undo the sublime: to know the outside absolutely—to survey it and predict it. This applies to the deniers as much as those earnestly working for ecological preservation. The deniers of climate change merely negate the predictions and trumpet the errors of their well-meaning counterparts; nonetheless, either side is concerned with a new epistemology of the future and human activity’s effects upon it. Again, Virilio has an intriguing way of thinking about this:

“In a world which is now foreclosed, where all is explained by mathematics and psychoanalysis, the accident is what remains unexpected, truly surprising, the unknown quantity in a totally discovered planetary habitat, a habitat overexposed to everyone’s gaze.” 2.

Sadly, after Kyoto, efforts to know the future, and generate economically calculable versions of the ecological milieu, result in the prolonged suffering of third world peoples “so that . . . prospering countr[ies] would not have to make difficult cuts in greenhouse gas emissions at home.”  3.

This leads me to my main point:

Calculations and Their Limits

One crucial problem arises, I think, from the historical interrelation between the emergences of statistics and of economics as disciplines. Probability theory as a form of statistics predicting the future emerged with Gauss in 1794. Malthus introduced the notion that population and demography are questions of government several years later. The Lausanne School introduced mathematics to economics around half a century later. One can remark the coentangling of these various events as historical indexes in the emergence of the kind of society in which we now live, a society for which what Virilio calls the accident is so disturbing: risk society. This notion, coined by Ulrich Beck (read a recent popular article here) hinges on the essential contention that increasingly (post)modern society orients its policy decisions by reference to the need to calculate the future.

Here is my hypothesis for all this complexity. I submit that this obsession with  the calculability of the future emerged in its most profound overdetermination most prominently in the study of economics. It was through prognosticating about the market that we invested in developing  the capacity — or the pretension — (to believe that) we could predict the future. Around this concern, an entire discourse of risk and calculability, oriented toward the future, emerged. Whether this pretension is an example of hubris or not, crucially the result is that, today, calculating the future insofar as it is (believed) possible is — I claim — done through a language derived from economic thought. Perhaps we could say, though this would take more historical research, from the Lausanne School forward. No wonder, then, that all our efforts to calculate climate futures are discursively filtered through economic considerations.

It is not only because our industries are run on fossil fuels that ecology and climate change are bound together in the reckonings that traverse the public sphere. It is also because we can conceive both economy (which once had a wider sense of resource management per se) apparently only through the metaphor of the deregulated market.  In a world — particularly after the 1980s — where calculating risk in general came to mean calcuating risk in relation to markets, all other forms of future risk in need of calculation — including the ecological and the geopolitical to which it is bound — are subject to the trappings of the former’s logic. It is for this reason that most attempts to deal with climate change have been articulated in market terms. It seems that, in a world where risk (of catastrophe) is referred first and foremost to economic risk. Responding to climate change and related potential ecological threats — often those which it precipitates like the various natural disasters and their geopolitical wakes — is a necessity. Doing so through market mechanisms may now be a necessity, given that we apparently lack any other language to describe risk. However I suspect, if so, correlative insistence on the sanctity of the market and the necessity of its supremacy in all vital  matters will be small comfort in Vanuatu . . .

1. Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles 66.

2. Virilio, Unknown Quantity 129

3. Robert P. Marzec, “Speaking Before the Environment,” in Modern Fiction Studies 55, 3 [2009], 426.

Further Reading:

One important critic who has been thinking about these questions is the Geographer David Harvey. An article of his was republished in the blogosphere not all that long ago.

Mike Hill and Tom Cohen have edited an important set of reflections on War, Ecology and Geopolitics, well worth a look, in The Global South 3, 1 (Spring 2009): 1-17

Visibility and Prayer, Post 911

                                         

It was a few days after the still recent death of Osama Bin Laden when I found myself at Melbourne Tullamarine Airport. By the drinking fountains, nondescriptly adjacent to a pair of vending machines, I noted a sign which read “prayer room.” I had seen these before, of course, in my travels, but there was something a little more conspicuous about the concept at this particular juncture. Something led me to think more seriously about how such a space functions. This is an introduction to the concept of the prayer room — for those unfamiliar — and a rumination on exactly how they might be seen to function in May of 2011.

First of all, why do people have rooms to pray in? It might be for the benefit of the devotee. I do not pray, myself, but I would imagine that this practice requires solitude (from strangers at least) and no doubt a thick silence. Conversely, some forms of prayer —notably Muslim — require the devotee to chant. It would seem that such private praxes do not fit too well in public space. A friend of mine told me that her undergrad institution (George Mason University in D. C.) used to have prayer rooms; she noted further that the Christian students would complain about them. The reason? One would have to speculate. Perhaps this was simple xenophobia. If so, it is undergrided by a funny kind of logic: I dislike your “other” religion, I do not wish to see it practiced publically, yet I will complain about the institution that disappears it from my sight. This is why visibility is implictly at the heart of the question. I want to say that perhaps these prayer rooms exist to place “other,” uncomfortable religious practices out of sight and out of mind. Yet the very existence of the institution simultaneously produces the opposite function: the prayer room is accompanied by a sign (like the one I saw at Tullamarine). It renders the practice of “other” prayer invisible but requires the visible sanction of the institution: and to those who revile such worship — and the belief it stands for — as culturally abject, its inverse visibility is objectionable. In being dematerialized and rendered invisible, the practice of the prayer room renders it visible.

As for the location of the prayer room in a Western airport, I have my ideas. Certainly, the visibility of Muslim prayer could be seen to prompt panic in such a space, particularly after September 11 2001. Of course, I am operating with the unstated premise that these rooms are primarily for Muslims. While prayer rooms are unmarked (“prayer room” not “halal prayer room”), nonetheless, they seem to be designated — in an implict, silent consensus — to be most of all for those of the Islamic faith. I felt, I must admit, somewhat ashamed after I stepped silently into the room to survey its contents, as if the space was some mute spectacle for my secularist amusement. The room contained a small carpet oriented East-West, a selection of religious materials in Arabic including the Khoran, and a tap for the bathing associated with prayer.

That the prayer room at Tullamarine Airport is habituated for Muslim worshippers extends the concept of visibility as it relates to these spaces. They are disappeared away and yet sign posted. The abject body of the Islamic other is emplaced in a sealed room precisely under the alibi of a protection of their religious freedom. Indeed, Muslims have had the sanctity of their private spaces of prayer violated in Melbourne in the recent past. Such violations are often justified as the victory of secularism. As a secularist myself, there is nothing that angers me more than the alchemical transmutation of secularism into tyranny over others.

Let me explain myself

Welcome,

Blogging about politics and culture has become a meaningful political act; it is pregnant with possibilities, acerbity, even violence of opinion.

Walter Benjamin once wrote: “[i]t is precisely the purpose of the public opinion generated by the press to make the public incapable of judging, to insinuate into it the attitude of someone irresponsible, uninformed.” Yet the blogosphere might offer an alternate and incandescent hope, a shard of light in these uncertain times. It is in optimistic embrace of this space in which opinion is recaptured from the “press” and redisseminated to the people that I wish to make some humble interventions. While I want to be serious, I hope there will be space for gentleness, humour, and serendipity here.

I look forward to thinking with you,

MRG

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